A Reprise on Herbert v. Lando and the Law of Defamation by Hunter, Howard O.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 71 | Issue 3 Article 3
1982
A Reprise on Herbert v. Lando and the Law of
Defamation
Howard O. Hunter
Emory University
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the First Amendment Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal
by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hunter, Howard O. (1982) "A Reprise on Herbert v. Lando and the Law of Defamation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 71 : Iss. 3 , Article
3.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol71/iss3/3
A Reprise on Herbert v. Lando
and the Law of Defamation
By HOWARD 0. HUNTER*
INTRODUCTION
Three and a half years ago, in an article, published in a sym-
posium issue of the Kentucky Law Journal focusing on the first
amendment, I examined the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion of Herbert v. Lando .2 The Court held that reporters, editors
and publishers are not protected by any "editorial privilege"
from "state of mind" inquiries during discovery in a defamation
case governed by the standard of liability set forth in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.3 The Supreme Court decision in Lando
stirred a mild flurry of academic comment, 4 partly because it re-
versed the Second Circuit's broad ruling in favor of an editorial
privilege.5 More interestingly, the case aroused a widespread
. Professor of Law, Emory University (Visiting Professor of Law, University of Vir-
ginia, 1982-83). B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University. I was ably assisted in the prepara-
tion of this article by Pamela Alexander of the Class of 1983, University of Virginia School
of Law.
1 Hunter, Editorial Privilege and the Scope of Discovery in Sullivan-Rule Libel
Actions, 67 Ky. L.J. 789 (1978-79).
2 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert was a highly decorated Army vet-
eran who was suddenly removed from his command of an airborne battalion in Vietnam.
His case became a "cause celebre" when he charged that his removal was part of an at-
tempt to cover up war crimes. His charges received a great deal of publicity, much of
which was favorable to Herbert. Some time later the results of further investigation cast
doubt on Herbert's credibility and the publicity became much less favorable. His defama-
tion suit was based on a segment of the CBS television program Sixty Minutes and a maga-
zine article, Lando, The Herbert Affair, AWL. MONTHLY, May 1973, at 73. See generally
Hunter, supra note 1, at 789-92.
3 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
4 See, e.g., Ashdown, Editorial Privilege and Freedom of the Press: Herbert v.
Lando in Perspective, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 303 (1980); Barron, The Rise and Fall of a
Doctrine of Editorial Privilege: Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 47 CEo. WAsH. L. REv.
1002 (1979); Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1979).
s See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 441 U.S. at 153. While
the case was pending before the Supreme Court, one of the Second Circuit judges in the
majority published a law review article explaining, expanding upon and justifying that
court's decision. See Oakes, Proof of Actual Malice in Defamation Actions: An Unsolved
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howl of indignation from the press which passionately suggested
that Lando had undermined the foundations of the first amend-
ment. 6 The academic commentators, including me, generally did
not consider Lando to be an exceptional case, nor was there
much concern that Lando would adversely affect media defen-
dants in defamation suits.7
The purpose of this essay is to examine Lando in retrospect.
Was it an important case? Did it substantially affect defamation
cases? Were members of the press right to be concerned about its
impact and its implications? After reading a number of post-
Lando decisions, my conclusion is that Lando was not an impor-
tant case and that it has had little, if any, discernible effect on
the law of defamation. Instead, Lando fits rather neatly into the
Supreme Court's own line of defamation decisions and is another
example of the Court's reluctance to carve out separate institu-
tional protection for the press." Nevertheless, Lando and subse-
quent cases leave open a number of questions about the current
state of defamation law. These questions, to which the remain-
der of this article is addressed, are: 1) What effect, if any, did the
Lando decision have upon the actual malice/reckless disregard
test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan? 2) Did Lando affect the
application by courts of the discovery rules in defamation cases?
Dilemma, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1979). See also Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando, Editorial
Judgment, and Freedom of the Press: An Essay, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 605.
6 Some of the more passionate responses (by rather well-known figures and institu-
tions) were collected and commented upon by Justice Brennan in an address given at Rut-
gers University at the dedication ceremonies for the S.I. Newhouse Center for Law and
Justice. Address by William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court (Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 178-81 (1979). See
also Franklin, supra note 4.
7 The one exception to the calm scholarly comment was Professor Ashdown, who
saw Lando as another in a series of anti-press decisions handed down by the Burger Court
beginning with Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See Ashdown, supra note 4.
Another commentator voiced concern about the Court's understanding of "relevancy" for
discovery purposes and the potential in the Court's opinion for more, rather than fewer,
discovery disputes, but his concerns had little to do with the basic first amendment argu-
ments made in the case. See Friedenthal, Herbert v. Lando: A Note on Discovery, 31
STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1979).
8 See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977); Lewis,
A Preferred Position for Journalism?, 7 HoFSRIA L. REv. 595 (1979); Nimmer, Introduc-
tion-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?,
26 HASTrNos L.J. 639 (1975); Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINS L.J. 631 (1975).
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and 3) What relationship, if any, is there between the Lando
decision and cases involving the assertion of a confidential source
privilege by journalists?
I. THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD
Public officials9 and public figures,' 0 to be successful plain-
tiffs in defamation actions, must plead and prove that the state-
ments of which they complain were published with "actual mal-
ice" or with a "reckless disregard" of the truth. A plaintiff who is
neither a public official nor a public figure only needs to meet a
negligence standard of proof under the ruling of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. " Because public officials and public figures usually
lose their defamation actions due to the difficulty of proving ac-
tual malice/reckless disregard, the most critical inquiry in such
libel cases is usually directed toward identifying the plaintiff's
status. Indeed, public officials and public figures usually lose on
summary judgment.12
9 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254.
10 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). In Rosenbloom v. Metro-
media, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), a plurality adopted a rule applying the actual mal-
ice/reckless disregard standard to plaintiffs who were involved in an incident of general
public concern, regardless of status. This approach was rejected three years later in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), when the Court returned its focus to the status
of the plaintiff and limited the actual malice/reckless disregard test to cases involving
plaintiffs who are either "public officials" or "public figures." Subsequently, there has
been considerable debate about who is a "public figure" and under what circumstances.
See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse, 8
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2340 (4th Cir. 1982); Hoffman v. Washington Post Co., 433 F.
Supp. 600 (D.D.C. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Note, Constitutional Pro-
tection of Critical Speech and the Public Figure Doctrine: Retreat by Reaffirmation, 1980
Wis. L. REv. 568.
" 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court in Gertz said that states could not impose liability
without fault even in private plaintiff cases. 418 U.S. at 347. This has generally been inter-
preted to be a negligence standard. Phillips v. Eening Star Co., 424 A.2d 78, 94 n.10
(D.C. 1980) (collecting state holdings), M. FRANKLIN, MASS MEDIA LAw 141 (2d ed. 1982).
12 Studies of defamation actions by the Libel Defense Resource Center have shown
that defendants prevail in three of four summary judgment motions. By way of compar-
ison, media defendants lost 90% of the cases tried to a jury, although 80% of these adverse
judgments which were appealed were later reduced or reversed by the appellate courts.
See Hunter, supra note 1, at 795 n.35 (cases requiring the plaintiff to meet a "clear and
convincing standard" of proof at summary judgment level); but cf. Clark v. ABC, 8
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2049 (6th Cir. 1982).
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What is often confusing to lawyers, litigants, judges, jurors
and commentators is that the actual malice/reckless disregard
standard is neither a malice test, as that term has been under-
stood at common law, nor a truth test. Instead, it is a test of the
publisher's state of mind as to the accuracy of what is being pub-
lished. If the publisher reasonably believes a story to be accurate
and has neither recklessly failed to take contradictory informa-
tion into account nor relied upon a source of clearly dubious
credibility, 13 the publication is protected even if it is false and de-
famatory. Actual malice can be shown if the publisher knew at
the time of publication that the statement in question was un-
true. 4 If such knowledge cannot be shown, the "reckless disre-
gard" test applies. Under the reckless disregard standard a much
greater showing than that required by a negligence standard is
necessary. In the words of the Supreme Court:
[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably
prudent man would have published, or would have investi-
gated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to
permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing
with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity
and demonstrates actual malice.15
In Lando, Lt. Col. Anthony Herbert's lawyers conceded be-
fore trial that he was a "public figure."' 6 Therefore, discovery
was directed toward meeting the actual malice/reckless disregard
standard. In so doing, Lando's attorneys tried to learn what edi-
torial decisions had been made, and how they were made, re-
garding the content of a segment on the CBS program Sixty Min-
utes which he alleged to be defamatory. Defense lawyers ob-
jected to these inquiries, arguing that the questions intruded into
areas of constitutional protection. In rejecting a constitutional
privilege for the editorial process, the Supreme Court determined
13 Fitzgerald v. Penthouse, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2342-43.
14 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
15 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
16 Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd 568 F.2d at 974,
rev'd, 441 U.S. at 153.
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that state of iiiind inquiries were mandated by the very nature of
the actual malice/reckless deregard test. 17
Even though the Court reaffirmed the New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan test for public official/figure plaintiffs, I expressed
some concern in a previous article for the way in which it was
done.18 Justice White's majority opinion cited a host of pre-Sulli-
van cases in support of the Court's commitment to the actual
malice standard. 19 However, the Sullivan standard is constitu-
tionally based and is fundamentally different from the common
law tort understanding of malice. 0 This aspect of Justice White's
opinion suggested either a misunderstandirig of the Sullivan test
or a subtle attempt to tinker with its foundations. In the body of
the Lando opinion, however, the majority did not hint at any
change in the Sullivan test.
The Supreme Court has not since addressed the status of the
Sullivan rule, 21 but the lower courts, for the most part, seem to
have agreed that Lando did not affect the substance of the actual
17 441 U.S. at 153. The Court stated, "New York Times and its progeny made it es-
sential to proving liability that the plaintiff focus on the conduct and state of mind of the
defendant. . .. Inevitably, unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts
and editorial processes of the alleged defamer would be open to examination." Id. at 160.
In fact, state of mind evidence has been used defensively; the Lando defendants them-
selves seemed to contemplate using such evidence. See Hunter, supra note 1, at 806-07.
18 See Hunter, supra note 1, at 808-09.
19 441 U.S. at 165 n.15. Professor Barron, on the other hand, seemed to believe that
the Court had made no attempt to change the standard, even indirectly. Barton, supra
note 4, at 1014.
20 In his dissent, Justice Stewart made this point:
[M]alice as used in the New York Times opinion simply does not mean
malice as that word is commonly understood. In common understanding,
malice means ill will or hostility, and the most relevant question in deter-
mining whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask
"why." As part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New York
Times case, however, "actual malice' has nothing to do with hostility or ill
will, and the question "why" is totally irrelevant.
441 U.S. at 199 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Although I do not wholly
agree with Justice Stewart's analysis, his discussion of the distinction between the common
law rule and the constitutional privilege is on point. See Hunter, supra note 1, at 807-08.
21 Libel defense lawyers have a powerful tool under Sullivan. Whatever the short-
comings of that constitutional standard, there is probably a reluctance to press the issue
too much since the result may turn out to be an expansion of the types of cases governed by
the negligence standard of Gertz and a reduction in the number governed by the much
more restrictive standard of Sullivan.
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malice test.2 A showing of common law malice habeen held to
be admissible and probative of Sullivan-rule actual malice,23 but
standing alone it is insufficient to meet the test. The Kansas
Supreme Court, however, seemed to confuse the common law
and constitutional malice tests in Gleichenhaus v. Carlyle.2 In
Gleichenhaus, the court allowed the discovery of information
concerning prior articles and editorials in which the plaintiff was
not even mentioned, because a showing of "a reckless indiffer-
ence to the rights and reputations of others may furnish a basis
for an inference that the publication in controversy was mali-
cious.",-
Repeated publication of stories of dubious validity may be
relevant to show sloppy or indifferent procedures, and may be
circumstantial evidence probative of reckless disregard, but it
also might tend to emphasize the wrong issue. The only real
question in a Sullivan-rule case is whether the publisher knew the
statements to be untrue or whether he or she published with
reckless disregard of their truth. Poor procedures in other publi-
cation decisions might cumulatively show a pattern of negligent
behavior (and therefore be especially pertinent to a private figure
case), but they do little to prove actual malice or reckless disre-
gard in a public official/figure case if the defendant can show a
good faith belief in the truth of the publication. Opinions of the
publisher about the plaintiff or about persons who are the sub-
jects of othei articles or editorials are not centrally relevant to an
actual malice/reckless disregard analysis. 2 This type of confusion
in dealing with the Sullivan standard suggests that some under-
22 See, e.g., Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726 (4th Cir. 1980); Uhl v. CBS, Inc., 476 F.
Supp. 1134 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282
(Ala. 1979); MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co., 612 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1980).
2 See, e.g., Curtis v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1651
(5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Schaefer v. Lynch, 406 So. 2d 185 (La. 1981); Pasculli v. Jer-
sey Journal, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2574 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981), certification
denied, 446 A.2d 152 (N.J. 1982); Ferguson v. Dayton Newspapers, 7 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 2502 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
24 597 P.2d 611 (Kan. 1979).
2 Id. at 614.
26 On the other hand, one can argue that a showing of personal animus may help in
finding that a publisher was not as open to the truth as. he or she might otherwise have
been.
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stand the actual malice test to include an element of personal
animus; undoubtedly, it would have been better had the Court
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan used a different word.
The Kansas Supreme Court in Gleichenhaus certainly did
not suggest that the Sullivan test had been abandoned in public
official/figure cases, even though it did not apply the test in a
manner entirely favorable to libel defendants. All other cases
since Lando have adhered to the Sullivan test, suggesting that my
concern about a subtle abandonment of the actual malice test in
Lando may have been incorrect. The Kansas Supreme Court's
confusion in its application does indicate, however, that some re-
thinking of the test is in order.
The incomprehensibility of the test to the untrained mind27
was made apparent in the recent victory scored by William
Tavoulareas of Mobil Oil against the Washington Post. 2 Tavou-
lareas and his son sued the Post concerning an article which sug-
gested that he had improperly furthered his son's career. The
Post tried the case before a jury, which awarded a substantial
sum to Mr. Tavoulareas but not to his son. A reporter for The
American Lawyer, a monthly magazine about attorneys, inter-
viewed the six jurors about their deliberations.2 The jurors told
the reporter that they understood the judge's instructions (which
were boiler plate public official/figure instructions) to mean that
the Post had to prove the truth of its story, not that the plaintiffs
had to prove that the Post knew the story to be untrue or acted
with reckless disregard.30 In fact, the jurors thought that the Post
story was probably true and that the reporters had acted respon-
sibly, but a seed of doubt about the ultimate truth of the story re-
mained. 31 This misunderstanding stands the New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan case on its head. A federal district court in Texas has
said: "Since New York Times the issue in cases like this has
27 1 mean "untrained" in the sense of not being tained in that special way of think-
ing which sometimes seems to afflict lawyers who otherwise exhibit fairly good common
sense.
28 Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, Civ. A. No. 80-3032 (D.D.C. July 30,1982).
2 Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial, AM. LAw., Nov.
1982, at 1.
30 Id. at 93.
31 Id.
1982-83]
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shifted from the truth of what was published to the state of mind
of the publisher.."32 The Tavoulareas jurors, by contrast, seemed
to say that the state of mind of the publishers was one of reason-
able belief, but the publishers still lost because they had not
proven truth beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimate truth, not the
publisher's state of mind, was the touchstone of their verdict. 3
The Tavoulareas case might be dismissed as an aberration-
one of those circumstances involving an odd chemistry of law-
yers, litigants, jurors and judge-but for the studies of the Libel
Defense Resource Center. These studies reveal 1) an abnormally
high success rate for Sullivan-rule defendants on motions for
summary judgment; 2) an abnormally poor success rate for de-
fendants in cases tried to a jury; and 3) an abnormally high rever-
sal rate for jury verdicts adverse to a libel defendant.-" With some
reluctance,1 a number of courts favor summary disposal of libel
cases. 36 Also, the public official/figure plaintiff generally has
been required to prove his or her case by a "clear and convinc-
ing" showing rather than simply by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.37
Judicial application of this standard during motion hearings
and on appeals has resulted in a high degree of protection for de-
fendants in such suits,-" but such solicitude apparently has not
carried over to juries. The great disparity between decisions by
32 Adams v. Maas, 7 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1188, 1190 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
33 The jurors also were confused about the public figure issue. They decided not to
award the son anything because he was a private figure. The father, a public figure, won
a large judgment because he was "famous" and damage to his reputation was worth more.
Brill, supra note 29, at 94.
34 The Post's lawyers in the Tavoulareas case relied on a study showing a high sym-
pathy level for the Post, as opposed to that shown for Mobil Oil, among the pool of poten-
tial jurors when deciding to go with a jury trial. Id. at 90. They must have disregarded the
findings of the Libel Defense Resource Center, discussed in note 12 supra.
3 See, e.g., DiLorenzo v. New York News, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981) C'Concern for the First Amendment should not be transformed into a requirement
that the plaintiff prove actual malice to the motion court").
36 Hunter, supra note 1, at 795 n.35.
37 Id. at 795 n.34.
'8 See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 527 F. Supp. 676 (D.D.C. 1981); Tavoulareas v.
Piro, 93 F.R.D. 11 (D.D.C. 1981); Tavouareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 24 (D.D.C. 1981); Ta-
voulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 35 (D.D.C. 1981). See generally Franklin, Suing Mediafor
Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 795.
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judges and juries can only be partially explained by circumstan-
tial factors such as the relative local importance of or level of re-
spect for the ligitants, by lawyers' tactics and by the fact that de-
fendants who lose summary judgment motions are the ones who
go to trial. More significant is the fact that the actual mal-
ice/reckless disregard test is confusing in its terminology and un-
clear in its application. It goes against much of our common,
shared experience. The concept of negligence is deeply ingrained
in our culture and conflicts with the notion that a reporter can
spread defaming lies with impunity so long as the reporter has
not been reckless in his or her disregard for the truth.39 The ac-
tual malice test also may go against ordinary sensibilities in sug-
gesting that the defamed victim prove that the defamer was reck-
less, rather than that the defamer prove he or she was not reck-
less.
To the extent, then, that the goal of the actual malice/reck-
less disregard test is to advance certain first amendment values by
promoting critical examination of public figures and officials,
that goal is met largely through the intervention of judges in the
litigation process. 40 Undoubtedly, the New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan decision has operated much to the benefit of the press.
And, even though Gertz applies a negligence standard for private
plaintiffs, its limitations on damage recoveries41 and its apparent
39 People may accept the fact that lies are spread; they may have more difficulty let-
ting the liar go free when caught, even if he did not actually know he was a liar.
40 This observation tends to support an argument made in a somewhat different con-
text by my colleague, William Mayton, that judges are the primary governmental guar-
dians of first amendment values. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process:
Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doc-
trine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 250-53 (1982). Although I do not wholly agree with him,
defamation cases of the last eighteen years seem to have proved his argument in that area.
Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Pro-
fessorMayton, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 283, 287-92 (1982).
41 Gertz does not allow punitive damages in negligence cases, but it leaves the issue
open for those cases involving proof of actual knowledge or reckless disregard. 418 U.S. at
350. The size of some recent awards has led one commentator to suggest that further lim-
itations on damage awards may be in the offing. See M. FRKa.Nm, supra note 11, at 171.
See also Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777 (Ore. 1979) (punitive damages in defamation
actions violate state constitutional equivalent of the first amendment); Franklin, supra
note 38.
1982-83]
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disavowal of libel per se42 show a judicial.solicitude for defama-
tion defendants.
The point to be gleaned from Lando and subsequent cases is
quite simple-although neither the Supreme Court nor lower
courts have consciously tried to change the actual malice/reckless
disregard test, all courts seem, at times, to be confused about
what the test entails and exactly how it is to be applied. This con-
fusion increases costs for everyone involved in defamation cases.
On the other hand, a slight reworking of the test would retain its
substance, reflect its application over the past eighteen years and
clarify its meaning. Simply eschewing the word "malice" would
be helpful. The following test might resolve the confusion:
A. If the plaintiff in a libel action is a public official or a
public figure, he must prove
i) That the statement complained of is false; and
ii) That the statement is injurious to him; and
iii) That the publisher knew at the time of publica-
tion that the statement was false or that the pub-
lisher, considering all the circumstances,43 acted
in reckless disregard of whether the statement
was true or false.
B. If the defendant moves for summary judgment with
supporting materials denying the third part of the test
(whether or not the first and second parts are denied),
the burden is on the plaintiff to respond with proof
sufficient to show a reasonable likelihood of eventual
success on the merits.
Part A simply restates the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
test without using the term "actual malice." There is no reason to
confuse a test directed toward determining a publisher's state of
42 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, said that states may develop their own li-
ability standards for private figure plaintiffs "so long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault." 418 U.S. at 347. But cf. Hogan v. Herald Co., 8 MEDiA L. REP. (BNA) 2567
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1982).
43 One of the critical circumstantial elements is whether the statement is "hot" news.
See, e.g., Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); DiLorenzo v. New York News,
432 N.Y.S.2d at 486. See also Schaefer, Defamation and the First Amendment, 52 COLO.
L. REv. 1 (1980) (criticizing the "hot news" justification).
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mind as to truth with language that implies a concern with a
publisher's attitudes. Part B reflects the jrevailing practice of
placing a heavy burden on the plaintiff at the motion hearing
and avoids use of language such as "clear and convincing proof'
which implies a standard more appropriate to a criminal case.
Instead, this proposal uses the standard applied in requests for
preliminary injunctions. 44 Using the standard for injunctions
offers the advantage of an existing body of law where analogies
may readily be found. At the same time, it maintains a high stan-
dard at the motion level which should adequately protect defen-
dants from the lengthy prosecution of public official/figure cases
of dubious ultimate merit.
II. DISCOVERY
Barry Lando was deposed in twenty-six sessions and the tran-
script of his testimony ran nearly 3,000 pages. 45 He objected to
relatively few questions compared to the extent of the entire dis-
covery process. 46 In my earlier article I suggested that the real
problem for libel defendants thus may be the open-ended nature
of discovery, not the specific questions directed to the reporter's
state of mind, 47 because a victory on the merits may seem -hollow
if it follows extensive, time-consuming, expensive discovery. In
order to minimize disruptive and intrusive effects of discovery in
defamation cases, I suggested that no new privileges need be
created.41 Rather, all that is required is sensitive application of
existing discovery rules and oversight by the trial judge. 49
44 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a) [hereinafter cited as FRCP]; Brown v. Chote, 411
U.S. 452, 456 (1973); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours,
Inc., 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
45 Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d at 982.46 See Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. at 392.
47 Hunter, supra note 1, at 819.
48 Id. at 820.
49 Sometimes the supervisory power available to a trial judge through the proper use
of FRCP 26 is overlooked. The onus may be on a litigant to bring the judge to action since
he or she may have other things on his or her mind, but the power is there to be used.
Judge Oakes, for instance, bewails the abuses possible through the misuse of the liberal
standards of the discovery rules, but fails to address adequately the trial court's supervisory
authority. Oakes, supra note 5, at 672-73. Professor Ashdown, on the other hand, recog-
1982-83]
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In several post-Lando cases, the courts have exhibited the
recommended sensitivity to the first amendment interests which
might be implicated by untrammelled discovery.s' No court has
attempted to re-create an "editorial privilege" such as the one re-
jected by the Supreme Court, but attempts to afford some pro-
tection to the editorial process have been made. Although the
case also involved a confidential source problem, the approach of
a Massachusetts district court is typical:
In exercising control over requested discovery a
judge ... must be particularly sensitive to prevent exposure
"for the sake of exposure" . . . or any other use of discovery as
a means of harassing a reporter or other potential witness by
forcing the needless disclosure of confidential relation-
ships .... A protective order, for example, would be re-
quired if the requested discovery were sought purely as retri-
bution for a written or broadcast news story, or if discovery
were sought to "chill" a particular point of view. Furthermore,
the same account must be taken of any particular hardship or
inconvenience which discovery may impose on a given reporter
as is regularly taken of the analogous difficulties confronted by
any other potential witness.51
In an early stage of the Tavoulareas litigation, the District
Court for the District of Columbia limited a discovery request by
the plaintiff after weighing his need for discovery against the de-
fendant's first amendment interests.5 2 The availability of the in-
formation from other sources was especially important to the
court, which relied on the "least restrictive alternative analysis"
of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 53 The plaintiff was en-
nizes the possible utility of FRCP 26, but fears that the number of judges is so great that
standards will vary too much and that only a constitutional privilege will suffice. Ash-
down, supra note 4, at 325. Professor Friedenthal seems to be of a similar mind. Frieden-
thai, supra note 7, at 1063.
So See, e.g., In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980); Ward v. Peabody, 405
N.E.2d 973 (Mass. 1980).
51 411 N.E.2d at 475 (citations omitted).
52 Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. at 36.
0 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Tavoulareas court also cited Heffron v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Neither of these cases had any-
thing to do with defamation, but they both focused on the question of the extent to which
restrictions on protected speech may be permitted. One test of a regulation is whether the
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titled to some of the information requested, despite the defen-
dant's assertion of first amendment concerns; however, the court
refused to compel disclosure of materials related to unpublished
articles because the defendant's first amendment interests out-
weighed the marginal relevance of the information.
A similar balancing approach has been used in other kinds of
lawsuits and in third party witness disputes. In a Title VII suit
against the New York Times, the court balanced the plaintiffs
need for information about areas involving the exercise of editor-
ial judgment against the defendant's assertion of first amend-
ment interests.5 The court relied upon Justice Powell's statement
in his concurring opinion in Lando that "when a discovery de-
mand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a district
court should measure the degree of relevance required in light of
both the private needs of the parties and the public concern im-
plicated."-'
One of the more interesting recent cases on this issue was
SEC v. McGoff, 6 which involved a Securities and Exchange
Commission investigation of a reporter. The court narrowed the
scope of an SEC subpoena so as to exclude any documents relat-
ing to editorial or newsgathering processes.A Although it recog-
nized that the Supreme Court had rejected press privilege claims
in Branzburg v. Hayes,58 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily59 and
Lando,6o the McGoff court found in those cases suggestions that
some balancing may be necessary when first amendment inter-
ests are implicated. 61 On this basis, the discovery was limited de-
spite the court's recognition that the information sought was
clearly relevant to the SEC investigations. 62
state interest involved, if legitimate, may be served by a regulation which is less restrictive
of speech interests.
54 Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
5 441 U.S. at 179 (Powell, J., concurring).
56 647 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981).
57 647 F.2d at 191.
5 408 U.S. at 665.
9 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
60 441 U.S. at 153.
61 647 F.2d at 191.
62 Id.
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Branzburg also has been used to justify limiting discovery
directed to a third party witness (a magazine) in an antitrust
case.63 In reaching its decision, the court considered the nature of
the suit, whether the information sought was central to the
claim, whether alternative sources had been exhausted and the
extent of first amendment interests involved.64 Although this case
might be read as simply another in the line developing a qualified
privilege for protection of confidential sources,e more was at
issue than the disclosure of a source. The magazine also was con-
cerned about inquiries into its editorial processes. 6
In a criminal case, the Third Circuit held that nonparty jour-
nalists should not be required to disclose unpublished informa-
tion even for in camera inspection by the court unless a showing
is made that the material is not available from another source
and that it is "centrally relevant."67 This standard applies
whether or not a confidential source is involved.
These cases hardly amount to an overwhelming rush to use
limitations on the discovery process as a means of protecting first
amendment interests, but they do show some sensitivity to the
problems that open-ended discovery can create for defamation
defendants. Two commentators, however, have taken issue with
the use of discovery rules to protect first amendment interests.
Professor Ashdown apparently does not believe that protective
orders and other devices provide enough protection for a process
of constitutional importance.6 Professor Friedenthal is con-
cerned with the potential for a whole new series of discovery dis-
putes if the relevancy standard is balanced against other inter-
6 In re Consumers Union, 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1681 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
64 Id. at 1682-83.
6 For a discussion concerning qualified privileges, see notes 79-110 infra and accom-
panying text.
66 6 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1682.
67 United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub
nom. Cuthbertson v. CBS, Inc., 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). This should, of course, be com-
pared with the Myron Farber case, In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J.), cert. denied sub
nora. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See also Florida v. Peter-
son, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1090 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981) (party requesting discovery must
show that the information is material and relevant, such information is not available from
unprivileged sources, discovery from other less disruptive sources was unsuccessful and the
defendant's constitutional rights would be violated without the evidence).
68 Ashdown, supra note 4, at 324-25.
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ests.0 Both make points worth considering, but each seems to fly
a bit wide of the mark.
Ashdown disagreed with the result in Lando because he fears
that intrusion into the editorial process will necessarily have an
adverse effect on the ultimate publication.7 The problem with
his line of argument is that, absent a fundamental change in the
actual malice/reckless disregard standard, inquiries into the state
of mind of the publisher will almost always be allowed. 71 There-
fore, it is unlikely that the editorial process will be excluded as a
substantive area of discovery exploration. Furthermore, without
the creation of an editorial privilege-which might have the de
facto effect of wiping out public official/figure libel actions-
sensitivity to the first amendment interests of defendants de-
mands that something be done to limit discovery fishing expedi-
tions. Ashdown may be correct in arguing that a balancing ap-
proach in discovery might not be entirely effective from a defen-
dant's standpoint, but perfect efficiency from the defendant's
perspective is not the goal.
Friedenthal's article is much less concerned with first amend-
ment issues. Instead, his criticism is of what he perceives to be at-
tacks on the relevancy standard in discovery.72 He opposes the use
of other "rights" as counterweights to relevancy for fear that such
0 Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 1062-63.
70 Professor Ashdown states:
The exercise of editorial judgment free of the demands of the market-
place means that the checking and informing system will operate proficient-
ly only if governmental interference is also kept to an essential minimum.
Any governmental regulation or influential restraint imposed on the analysis
stage of the publication process necessarily affects both the quantity and
quality of the finished product. Expression is the product of the editorial
process. The regulation of the process is therefore the regulation of the ex-
pression.
Ashdown, supra note 4, at 314 (footnotes omitted). There is, however, a significant differ-
ence between allowing a discovery request in a libel case and regulating publications.
71 Even Judge Oakes recognized this fact, asking, "How else could a plaintiff prove
'actual malice,' defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, if
not by the closest inquiry into the mind of the alleged defamer?" Oakes, supra note 5, at
659 (footnote omitted). This statement leads one to the inevitable conclusion that Judge
Oakes really meant to attack the actual malice standard in his proposal for the recognition
of an editorial privilege. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 1055.
72 Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 1062.
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use will create a multitude of new discovery disputes and lead to
forum shopping for more liberal rules.7 3 His fears seem over-
stated. Although the relevancy standard of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is indeed a liberal one, courts regularly must de-
cide whether a particular line of inquiry is relevant at all and, if
so, whether its relevance is of sufficient importance to outweigh
other factors such as costs of production, delays in litigation,
business confidentiality and personal privacy. Also, too many
other factors are involved in deciding whether to initiate an ac-
tion. A given court's understanding of the substantive constitu-
tional standards or the public/private figure distinction might
well have much more to do with a plaintiff's choice of forum
than the same court's application of the discovery rules. 74
Undoubtedly, courts may appear to use significantly dif-
ferent balancing tests and thus create the appearance of a lack of
uniformity. This should be expected, however, when the appli-
cation of a balancing approach depends primarily upon the con-
textual dynamics of a given case. The real problem is not one of
efficiency, but rather of justification. If a constitutional editorial
privilege is not to be created, why should a defamation defen-
dant be treated differently from any other defendant who com-
plains about the burden of the discovery process? Wouldn't this
be an attempt to give the press 5 a special institutional status
despite the Supreme Court's refusal to do so?76
The answers seem fairly straightforward. First, as long as
non-media libel defendants are afforded the same constitutional
protections as media defendants, the problem of creating a spe-
73 Id. at 1062-64.
74 Defamation is a state tort action; thus, many libel cases will originate in state
courts anyway. Because not all states have procedural rules similar to the federal ones,
what is said about federal discovery applies only by way of analogy in many cases.
75 Arguably, libel defendants other than the press also should be treated differently.
See Hunter, supra note 1, at 809-15; Note, Mediaocracy and Mistrust: Extending New
York Tjines Defamation Protection to Nonmedia Defendants, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1876
(1982).
76 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436
U.S. at 547; First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring); Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press: A Comment on Some New
Trends and Some Old Theories, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 23 (1980) (arguing that while it is
not "infeasible to define a class of journalists" and to give them special first amendment
protection, it would be a mistake to do so).
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cial caste of defendants, most of whom would be journalists, does
not exist. Second, the substantive justifications for the Sullivan
rule and for other limitations on the defamation tort are directed
toward protecting constitutional rights. Therefore, it is reason-
able to argue that the procedural rules should be subject to some
limitations designed to insure that the substantive constitutional
protections accorded to defamation defendants are not unreason-
ably invaded. Third, there is absolutely no reason why a court
should not balance the degree of relevancy of the information
sought against the interests that might be affected by its produc-
tion whenever the defendants in libel cases or other cases have in-
terests, constitutional or otherwise, which they want to protect
against overly intrusive discovery inquiries. 7 Fourth, despite the
ultimate constitutional justification for a careful examination of
relevancy in a libel case, using the nonconstitutional procedures
available in the discovery process employs existing rules with
which lawyers are familiar and does not involve the creation of a
new privilege of uncertain scope. 71
III. CONFUSING THE ASSERTION OF A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
PRIVILEGE WITH THAT OF AN EDITORIAL PRIVILEGE
The Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized a priv-
ilege for the protection of a confidential news source, 79 but lower
courts have created and recognized a qualified privilege.8" Some
77 Two collateral goals also might be served: 1) the parties may be forced to focus on
the real theory of the case at an earlier stage and to channel their energies more efficiently,
and 2) the judge may be encouraged to exert greater control to insure that a case does not
become hopelessly bogged in a morass of discovery. As a practical matter, defendants can
often use discovery as a means to avoid and to delay consideration of the case on the
merits. The expense and delay attendant on taking the Lando discovery dispute to the
Supreme Court exemplifies the problem of sidetracking.
78 This would satisfy a criticism made by Professor Franklin: "In their efforts to ob-
tain relief from the logical sweep of New York Times, the media have put themselves in
the position of asking for what appear to be special constitutional rules-and have failed
to pursue more promising nonconstitutional substantive and procedural relief." Franklin,
supra note 4, at 1049.
79 In fact, the Court has rejected the privilege in the only case in which it faced the
issue. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 665.
80 See generally Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Priv-
ilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 709 (1975); Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair
Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REy. 1173 (1980).
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states have enacted statutes which also create a source privilege. 1
The editorial privilege asserted in Lando is fundamentally
different from the confidential source privilege. 82 The issue in
Lando was whether the editing process, including conversations,
memoranda, outtakes, states of mind and so on (whether confi-
dential or not) could be immunized from discovery. The source
privilege focuses on one discrete aspect of the process-the acqui-
sition of information from a person who does not want to disclose
his or her identity. The decision about the use of information
from a confidential source is part of the editorial process and is
properly subject to discovery even if the identity of the source is
not. Inquiries into the editorial process may have some effect on
free-ranging discussions, and they may make reporters more
aware of the possibility that their editing decisions might be sub-
jected to hindsight review, but the forced disclosure of a confi-
dential source can have the more serious effect of cutting off an
avenue for the acquisition of news and information.
Some courts have confused the different privilege issues, with
mixed results for journalists. Courts in Minnesota, Pennsylvania
and New Jersey have construed the shield laws of those states to
create an editorial privilege similar to the privilege rejected by
the Supreme Court in Lando. In Aerial Burials, Inc. v. Minne-
apolis Star & Tribune Co. ,8 the defendant refused to disclose
notes and interview transcripts which related to unpublished
material. The court upheld the defendant's position by constru-
ing the Minnesota "free flow of information" act8 to prevent the
forced disclosure of unpublished information even when the
source was known. Interestingly, the statute expressly exempted
from its coverage evidence relevant to the issue of actual malice
in a Sullivan-rule libel case.8 The court, in accepting what the
defendant must have known was a bootstrap argument, held
81 State "shield" laws vary in the degree of protection granted. For a partial listing of
state shield laws, see Note, Shield Statutes: A Changing Problem in Light of Branzburg,
25 WAYNE L. REv. 1381, 1386 n.40 (1979).
82 See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 11, at 585 (noting the possibility of confusion, but
arguing that the two problems are fundamentally different).
83 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1653 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1982).
84 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West 1973).
8 5 Id. § 595.025.
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that the information was not relevant because the defendant tes-
tified that it had not been relied upon. 8
The Pennsylvania shield law87 is substantially the same as
that of Minnesota. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Steaks
Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner18 stated that the Pennsylvania statute
protects all unpublished material even when the identity of the
source is known. The court justified this conclusion by reasoning
that the protection of unpublished information from a nonconfi-
dential source is necessary to protect possible secondary sources
who might thereby be revealed. The court presumed confiden-
tial secondary sources might exist without requiring the defen-
dant to offer any evidence of their existence and without under-
taking any in camera review.89 Unlike the Minnesota court, the
Third Circuit did recognize that the unpublished informfiation
might be relevant to the libel plaintiffs claim. 1 The court noted
that the Supreme Court in Lando had rejected an editorial priv-
ilege in part because it would substantially reduce the opportuni-
ties for a libel plaintiff to meet the actual malice standard, but
stated that the Lando decision did not preclude a state from
adopting a different approach. 91 Thus, the court felt free to apply
the Pennsylvania shield law in a way that creates an almost in-
surmountable obstacle for libel plaintiffs.9 2
In a 1982 decision the New Jersey Supreme Court construed
the state's shield law to create an absolute privilege from disclo-
sure of editorial processes.9 3 The defendant had asserted affirma-
tive defenses of good faith, truth and absence of malice. It had
86 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 1654.
87 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (Purdon 1982). This is a recodification of 28 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 330 (Purdon 1958), the shield law in effect at the time the trial court
rendered its decision in Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
8 623 F.2d at 264.
8 Id. at 279.
90 The court recognized that "comparison of the material actually published and
other material, possibly favorable to the plaintiff, that was in the defendants' possession
but omitted from the publication or broadcast is probably the most common method of
proving that the defendants acted with knowing or reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at
277 n.62.
9' Id. at 279 n.74.
92 Id. at 277-79.
93 Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 383 (N.J. 1982). Cf. In re Farber,
394 A.2d at 330.
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also provided the names of nonconfidential sources, but the court
said that none of this amounted to a waiver of its protection
under the shield law. 9 The New Jersey court reasoned, as had
the Third Circuit, that the limitation which the shield law
placed on the prosecution of a libel action was a matter of state
law and that the Lando case was essentially irrelevant. 95
The results in states without shield laws also are mixed. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court, for instance, has held that a de-
fendant does not have an absolute privilege to refuse to disclose
confidential sources when the latter are essential to the plaintiff's
case."0 That alone would not be surprising; the rule has been
much the same for about twenty-five years.97 But the court went
on to say, citing Lando, that the "Supreme Court has indicated
that to meet the New York Times standard, any press privilege
must give way before the First Amendment." 8 This was an ob-
vious misunderstanding of the difference between the source
privilege and the overall editorial privilege rejected in Lando.99
The court said that a refusal to disclose a source would justify a
presumption that the defendant had no source and, therefore,
that the publication complained of was baseless.'1 0 Needless to
say, this approach could put a libel defendant in a bit of a quan-
dry.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Miller v. Transamer-
ican Press, Inc.,101 displayed a greater understanding of the dis-
tinctions between the confidential source problem and the edi-
torial privilege issue. The court explicitly recognized a qualified
privilege not to disclose a source, but stated that the privilege
1 445 A.2d at 382-83. See also Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJM Associates, 445 A.2d 395
(N.J. 1982). At some point, a defendant's assertion of certain defenses should open it to ap-
propriate inquiry. See Hunter, supra note 1, at 806-07.
95 445 A.2d at 394. See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
98 Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 415 A.2d 683 (N.H. 1980).
97 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
98 415 A.2d at 686.
99 The court did agree that there must be a dispute about falsity before disclosure
would be ordered. Id.
10 Id. Accord DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981).
101 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), opinion supplemented and reh'g denied, 628 F.2d 932
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
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could be overcome by a showing that the identity of the source is
relevant and critical to the claim, that the information is not
available from other sources and that the claim is meritorious. 0 2
In Miller, the court noted that the Supreme Court had deter-
mined in Lando that discovery of the editorial process would not
have a chilling effect (or at least not enough to justify creating a
constitutional privilege), but the court went on to reason that the
disclosure of confidential sources might well limit the ability of
the defendant to gather news. 1°0 Thus the confidential source
question should be separated from the general editorial privilege
issue.
In comparison, a Connecticut trial court utterly rejected first
amendment arguments advanced by a television station defen-
dant in connection with certain discovery inquiries made by a
public official plaintiff. 0 4 The defendant sought protection for
confidential sources and for its notes, memoranda, videotapes
and other records pertaining to the allegedly libelous broadcast.
Citing Branzburg for the proposition that "the law is entitled to
every man's testimony," the court compelled full disclosure."°5
102 621 F.2d at 725. In adopting this approach the court relied upon Carey v. Hume,
492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Cervantes v. Time, Inc.,
464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Garland v. Torre, 259
F.2d at 545.
103 621 F.2d at 725. Accord Mize v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 1 (S.D. Tex.
1980). See also Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir.
1980) (recognizing a qualified source privilege and adopting a similar three-part test for
overcoming the privilege but adding a burden on the defendant to establish a need for pre-
serving the confidence); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (privilege
derived from common law, not the Constitution); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641
P.2d 1180 (Wash. 1982). Contra Rancho La Costa v. Penthouse Int'l, 6 MEDIA L. REP.
(BNA) 1249 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1980) (Herbert v. Lando "rules out" a source privilege). See
generally Comment, Source Disclosure in Public Figure Defamation Actions: Towards
Greater First Amendment Protection, 33 HAsriNCs L.J. 623 (1982).
104 Rubera v. Post-Newsweek Stations, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2293 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1982).
lOs Id. at 2295. In a strange passage, the court said: "The individual citizen should
and does have much greater rights than government .... The people are not restricted
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution-government is." Id. This ra-
tionale was used to support the plaintiff's argument for access to defendant's information.
The judge seemed oblivious to the fact that the tort action was created and enforced by the
state, that the discovery rules were written and are enforced by the state, and that by si-
ding with the plaintiff he, as an officer of the state, was putting all the power, authority
and prestige of the state behind the plaintiff. Of course, it is true that direct inquiries by
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Recognizing a qualified source privilege for news reporters
undoubtedly has some value. Journalists, at least, perceive the
privilege to be valuable even though they may disagree about the
utility of statutory protections. 101 Arguments against an absolute
privilege and for limitations on the exercise of a qualified priv-
ilege also have merit. The danger is in confusing the narrow pur-
pose served by the confidential source privilege-the protection
of a means for the acquisition of information-with the broader
purpose of protecting the editorial process in general from dis-
covery.
For the reasons discussed briefly in this essay and at greater
length in my earlier article,17 I believe that the overall publica-
tion process-from the acquisition of information to its actual
publication-is suffused with constitutional interests which
should be taken into account whenever there is a state-supported
review or inquiry. Some aspects of that process are entitled to,
and have traditionally been afforded, extraordinary constitution-
al protection. For instance, governmental restriction of the con-
tent of the actual publication is limited. Likewise, the govern-
ment can do little to prevent or to regulate the acquisition of
information by lawful means (breaking and entering is not pro-
tected by the first amendment), although the government itself
may refuse to be a source. 0 In other areas, the obligations of cit-
izenship provide some counterweight to the rights of speech and
press which may be involved in a particular activity; paying taxes
may burden a publisher, but not unconstitutionally if fairly allo-
cated. 09 Simple fairness dictates that similar balancing between
agencies of government may have the potential for a greater chilling effect than intrusions
resulting from discovery in a private tort action. See Lewis, supra note 8, at 624.
106 See Dixon, The Constitution is Shield Enough for Newsmen, 60 A.B.A. J. 707
(1974); O'Neil, Shield Laws: Partial Solution to a Pervasive Problem, 20 N.Y.L.F. 515
(1975); Paul, Why a Shield Law?, 29 U. M1AMI L. Rlv. 459 (1975).
107 Hunter, supra note 1, at 816-17.
108 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. at 1. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). But cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979). See
also Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct.
2799 (1982).
109 Compare Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819 (Ariz. 1937), appeal dismissed, 301 U.S.
670-(1937) (state excise tax on gross proceeds from business of publication of newspapers
held constitutional) with Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (state li-
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first amendment concerns and those of the plaintiffs are in order
in defamation cases. Since the defendant's rights have a constitu-
tional dimension, it is certainly appropriate to weight the scales
more heavily in that direction, although there may be arguments
about precisely where to place the balance. Within the litigation
context, this can often and most simply be handled through the
reasonable application of discovery rules which are already in
place.
CONCLUSION
The extreme reaction to the Lando case resulted, most likely,
from journalists' tendencies to overemphasize the importance of
decisions relating to speech and press issues and to magnify the
adversarial nature of conflicts with governmental bodies. The re-
action certainly is natural. Anyone whose personal or business in-
terests are involved in a lawsuit will tend to view the decision as
particularly important. This perception is distorted when the
press is involved because its concerns are widely disseminated.
Nevertheless, the press probably did overreact to Lando, espe-
cially since the Court reaffirmed the New York Times Co. v. Sul-
livan test which, despite its inherent ambiguities, has served the
press extraordinarily well in defamation cases.
In reviewing the Lando decision and the cases decided subse-
quently, my conclusions remain that Lando was correctly de-
cided so long as the Sullivan rule is unchanged, and that it was a
relatively unimportant decision. It will probably become a minor
footnote in the history of the defamation tort. The only real
problem it has spawned is that of some confusion about the dif-
ference between the newsperson's confidential source privilege
and the more generalized assertion of an editorial privilege.
The more critical areas of concern from the perspective of the
press which remain after Lando are:
1) The public figure/private figure distinction. The Gertz
decision created a substantial advantage for the private figure
plaintiff, and some plaintiffs of decided notoriety have been
cense tax only applicable to newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 copies
per veek held unconstitutional).
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treated as private figures n." Limited use of the "public figure"
category will reduce the utility of the Sullivan case.
2) Clarification of the Gertz liability and damage standards.
Does Gertz actually do away with per se libel?"' If Gertz limits
plaintiffs to actual damages unless the actual malice/reckless dis-
regard test is met, are courts silently allowing the award of puni-
tive damages? Some recent awards have been quite large.112
3) Clarification of the actual malice standard. How can. the
test be retained in substance but made more readily understand-
able? There is something fundamentally confusing about a test
which when applied by judges almost always favors defendants
and when applied by juries almost always favors plaintiffs. The
danger for the press is that revisions may diminish the value of
the test as a shield for defamation defendants.
4) Possibly greater use of the privacy tort. Since a "private
facts" plaintiff" 3 need not prove falsity, that cause of action can
be a useful supplement to the basic defamation action. The pub-
lic/private figure distinction also is critical in these cases.
5) Control of the discovery process. Large corporate defen-
dants, such as CBS or the New York Times, can afford to spend
enormous amounts of money on litigation-even to the point of
taking discovery disputes to the Supreme Court. For small news-
papers, small radio stations and individuals, the costs of litigation
can be prohibitive, especially if discovery is wide open. This
problem is shared by all kinds of litigants, but it can have a perni-
cious effect on the first amendment freedoms of less well-off de-
fendants.
110 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 448. According to Professor Frank-
lin, "General public figures have been few and far between since Gertz." M. FRANKLIN.
supra note 11, at 165.
"' Gertz prohibits the imposition of "liability without fault." 418 U.S. at 347.
112 See Franklin, supra note 38, at 805.
113 For a recent discussion of the privacy tort in an unsuccessful attempt by a shop-
ping center developer to use it as an adjunct to a defamation action, see Goodrich v.
Waterbury Republican-American, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2329 (Conn. 1982) (also recog-
nizing a common law right of action for invasion of privacy).
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